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Communication Through Removable Media

Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system.[1] Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.

ID: T1092
Sub-techniques:  No sub-techniques
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Tactic: Command and Control
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Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
Version: 1.0
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 24 October 2025

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
G0007 APT28

APT28 uses a tool that captures information from air-gapped computers via an infected USB and transfers it to network-connected computer when the USB is inserted.[2]
S0023 CHOPSTICK

Part of APT28's operation involved using CHOPSTICK modules to copy itself to air-gapped machines, using files written to USB sticks to transfer data and command traffic.[3][4][2]
S0136 USBStealer

USBStealer drops commands for a second victim onto a removable media drive inserted into the first victim, and commands are executed when the drive is inserted into the second victim.[1]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1042 Disable or Remove Feature or Program

Disable Autoruns if it is unnecessary.[5]
M1028 Operating System Configuration

Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if they are not required for business operations.[6]

Detection Strategy

ID Name Analytic ID Analytic Description
DET0090 Cross-host C2 via Removable Media Relay AN0247

Behavioral sequence where removable media is mounted, files are written/updated, and subsequently read/executed on a separate host, suggesting removable-media relay communication.
AN0248

Detection of file write-access to USB-mount directories (e.g., /media/, /run/media/) followed by same-file access or execution on another host.
AN0249

Correlates removable volume mounts (disk arbitration) with file I/O events on that volume, followed by same file execution shortly after insert.

References

  1. Calvet, J. (2014, November 11). Sednit Espionage Group Attacking Air-Gapped Networks. Retrieved January 4, 2017.
  2. Anthe, C. et al. (2015, October 19). Microsoft Security Intelligence Report Volume 19. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
  3. FireEye. (2015). APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS?. Retrieved August 19, 2015.
  1. ESET. (2016, October). En Route with Sednit - Part 2: Observing the Comings and Goings. Retrieved November 21, 2016.
  2. Microsoft. (n.d.). How to disable the Autorun functionality in Windows. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
  3. Microsoft. (2007, August 31). https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc771759(v=ws.10).aspx. Retrieved April 20, 2016.